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The
reasons are many, including China's help accelerating Pakistan's nuclear
technology, missile systems, and cyber and drone warfare capabilities.
In the 1983 film WarGames, a nuclear war
simulation is accidentally started by a supercomputer designed to take over in
the event of the Cold War spiralling out of control. After evaluating all the
possibilities, the computer declares that “war is a strange game, in which the
only winning move—is not to play.” That advice is possibly truest for India
right now.
For all the xenophobic war
mongering touted in every medium, India cannot “win” a war against Pakistan and
the sooner we appreciate this politico-military reality, the more coherent and
serious we will sound to our adversaries and the world community. The demands
for a “once and for all” resolution of Kashmir/Pakistan emanating from several
quarters, which surprisingly includes some veterans—equating India’s
non-retaliation with impotence—perhaps don’t factor the larger picture and the
stark truth of modern military warfare.
Matter of fact, short of total
genocide, no country regardless of its war-withal can hope to achieve a
decisive victory with a “short war” in today’s world. As the US is
discovering eight years, trillion dollars, and over 25,000 casualties later—in
Afghanistan. That era of “decisive” short wars, especially in the Indo-Pak
context, is largely over because of several reasons.
Firstly, the much vaunted Indian military
superiority is largely an accounting subterfuge. Sure we have more soldiers,
tanks, aircraft, and ships than Pakistan, but banking on mere numbers is
misleading and irrelevant in military strategy. Pakistan has successfully
locked down over 30% of our army in internal counter insurgency roles that not
only sucks in combat troops from their primary roles for prolonged periods, but
also alienates the local population in the valley.
The major reason for the
Pakistani Op Gibraltar’s failure in 1965 was the overwhelming loyalty of
Kashmiri locals towards India. Disguised Pakistani troops who had infiltrated
into the valley to incite rebellions were caught by the locals and promptly
handed over to the Indian security forces. Fifty years later, sentiment in the
valley is very different. And this “turning move” has been achieved by Pakistan
with a ridiculously low investment of merely a few hundred terrorists and
psychological operations.
Another substantial part of our army is locked down in the North
East insurgency and we are still trying to build adequate force levels against
our much stronger adversary all along our border with China. India’s Chinese
front is in a tenuous state because of decades of neglect and the massive
infrastructure China has built to be able to mobilise several divisions in a
matter of hours into that theatre.
Most worryingly, Pakistan and
China have achieved military interoperability, which is the capability of their
two armies to execute joint missions against a common target. Decades of mutual
cooperation, technology transfer, training, equipment sales, and of course a
common enemy, have welded our two adversaries into a formidable joint force.
Pakistan’s accelerated achievements in nuclear technology, missile delivery
systems, logistic supply chain of equipment, and spares as well as new-age
technologies such as cyber and drone warfare are all the result of cooperation
between the two countries.
In contrast, India has not even
been able to integrate its three services, what to speak of assimilation with
political leadership, industry, academia and indigenous defence capabilities.
As Praveen Sahwney points out in his book “The Dragon on our doorsteps,” India
has primarily focused on developing its military arsenal whereas Pakistan and
China have been developing war waging capabilities, which is a synthesis of
many strengths other than just military force.
Secondly, Pakistan has leveraged
its geopolitical position far more strategically than India has been able to.
India has traditionally relied on moral high ground to achieve global consensus
and support. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the world’s largest democracy,
wedged in between a communist adversary and a rapidly radicalising Islamic
nation got global mindshare and sympathy. Though none of that translated into
meaningful benefits for India per se, our foreign policy continues to have the
hangover of “doing the right thing.” Unfortunately, in the harsh reality of the
contemporary world that doesn’t count for much.
DON'T MISS
Russia, our traditional all-weather friend, has far greater
bonhomie with both the US and China than ever before. The US needs
Pakistan to achieve closure in Afghanistan so much so, that despite the blatant
betrayal of shielding America’s public enemy number one, Osama bin Laden, the US has
no choice but to continue supporting Pakistan financially and militarily. On
the other hand Pakistan’s dependence on the US has reduced
dramatically with China filling in the gap.
China’s “One Belt One Road”
project coursing through the length of Pakistan has pretty much made the two
permanent partners. China’s economic aspirations and access to the Arabian Sea
through Baluchistan ending at Gwadar port is a strategic masterstroke by
Pakistan and China. Not only is it a win-win for them but it is also a
“lose-lose” for India for many reasons.
Firstly, the only area where
India could try a meaningful riposte to Pakistan-sponsored insurgency would be
Baluchistan. By tying in China’s stake of keeping Baluchistan under control,
Pakistan has made it extraordinarily difficult for India to make any aggressive
move in its south without threatening Chinese interests. The same is true for
any Indian military action in the theatres of Kashmir or Punjab. Any Indian
operation that endangers thousands of Chinese citizens working on the CPEC project
in Pakistan will draw the wrath of China and give them the loco standi to
initiate hostilities against India. So beyond shallow skirmishes all along the
border, India really has no operational or strategic options without the risk
of drawing China into a two-front war.
Pakistan has correctly
appreciated that the force levels which India will be able to muster against it
will be more or less evenly matched, and in the event of Indo-Pak hostilities,
they can depend on China for their logistics supply chain as well as splitting
the Indian armed forces’ resources and focus by mobilising PLA divisions
along the border with India. This would in effect, pin down a substantial part
of the Indian Army’s reserves to cater for the eastern front.
Also, now there too many
stakeholders dependent on the success of the “One Belt One Road”/CPEC project
and any disturbance in this area would be attributed to India’s truculence
rather than Pakistan’s interference into Kashmir. China combine has positioned
the OBOR as an Asian developmental initiative, whereas the Kashmir
problem has been positioned as a bilateral local issue—by none other than India
itself. So, rather than looking like the visionary big player in the Asian
growth story, India is at the risk of being perceived as the obdurate party
incapable of setting aside bilateral issues for the larger good of the region.
And with dark clouds hovering over their own respective challenges, none of the
world’s major powers, the US, UK, Russia or France, will have the
gumption to interfere militarily in an Indo-Pak conflict that has the potential
to draw in the fifth permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Politically too, India is in no
position to consider a short war. The current political dispensation is only
just gathering momentum on its electoral manifestoes, the lynchpin of which is
economic development. That necessitates a stable and peaceful environment. War
clouds are an antithesis for economic investments. Even preparation for war
costs billions of dollars in terms of resources and mindshare, a diversion that
India can scarcely afford when millions of youth are entering the job market
whose un-channelised energies is another potential risk.
For a nation to go to war, all
its pillars of strength, including its military, economic prowess, industrial
capability, external alliances and national will must be aligned in a singular
direction to achieve meaningful success. War waging is not about bombastic
threats, surgical strikes, cross-border firing or clamorous bellowing on TV channels.
That is called letting off steam. There is an old couplet by Ramdhari Dinkar
which suggests that forgiveness befits a snake which has venom in its bite—not
one which is weak, toothless, and harmless. To be taken seriously, India needs
to build that strength first rather than spewing ineffectual rhetoric.
source --> http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/05/lets-not-kid-ourselves-india-will-not-win-war-against-pakistan/138129/
